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ISBN 90-5833-250-0Abstract in English
This study contains several tests to show that individuals overreact to negative wealth changes,
relative to positive wealth changes. This asymmetry, that is found using micro data, suggests that
economists should not treat symmetrically the relation between economic variables
(consumption for instance) and wealth in their models when wealth decreases. We ﬁnd that this
asymmetry increases with age and picks at retirement.
Abstract in Dutch
Deze studie bevat een aantal toetsen die laten zien dat individuen sterker reageren op een
negatieve ontwikkeling van hun vermogen dan op een positieve verandering. Deze asymmetrie,
die wij in onze microgegevens vinden, suggereert dat economen de relatie tussen economische
variabelen en vermogen niet als symmetrisch zouden moeten behandelen. We vinden dat deze
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56Summary
Different governmental agencies and international institutions have failed in the last couple of
years their predictions of net private consumption, by overestimating it. In this study we argue
that this may be partly due to the fact that changes in ﬁnancial wealth are perceived
asymmetrically. It is therefore plausible that these changes may have an asymmetric effect on
economic variables. Consumption may be the most evident example of this asymmetric relation.
We do not directly relate wealth gains and losses to consumption patterns. We only test whether
individuals over react to ﬁnancial losses relative to ﬁnancial gains. As yearly time series with
sufﬁcient variation in ﬁnancial wealth levels (that enter household portfolios in a non negligible
way) will only become available in the future, we base our analysis on micro data. We do not
have sufﬁcient data at macro level to enquiry this phenomenon therefore we suggest that our
micro results may be of inspiration for solving the macro problem. However the link between
micro and macro level is only tentative. Aggregation of micro wealth data derived from surveys
misrepresents the stock of wealth and it’s variation, as reported by national accounts. This is due
to the under-representation in surveys of the top percentiles of the wealth distribution.
The tests we perform are both non parametric and fully parameterised. The ﬁrst analyse
whether individuals form symmetrical expectations in terms of positive and negative changes of
ﬁnancial wealth. These non parametric tests study the subjective distribution of expectations in
order to understand whether individuals report a symmetric moment of this distribution. This
hypothesis is largely rejected in all tests. We show that there is a remarkable drop in expectations
at age 64. This expected drop does not come true at age 65. As this is a remarkable piece of
evidence, we also tried to explain what causes it and we ﬁnd that more than one third of the drop
is due to the eligibility to mandatory retirement.
Later we drop self reported expectations and study self reported realisations. Disposing of
ﬁnancial realisations and portfolio composition data, we test parametrically whether the
perceived changes in ﬁnancial wealth correspond to the observed changes. Our models, that also
take into account unobserved heterogeneity, show that indeed individuals do not evaluate
symmetrically changes that occurred in their wealth. The models also allow an indicative
measurement of this asymmetric response and show that typically individuals tend to over react
to small decreases in ﬁnancial wealth. The perceived threshold of a wealth increase is on average
one and half times larger than the one of a wealth decrease. The literature suggests a little higher
relation, however our results show that this asymmetry is larger as the population ages. The
parametric analysis shows plausible results for most of the indicators that we introduced, and
shows that not only ﬁnancial indicators, but also shocks, are a determinant of the asymmetric
reaction to wealth changes.
Combining the last two remarks (older individuals tend to be more ‘asymmetric’, retirees
expectations of ﬁnancial wealth show unjustiﬁed drops) with the current population dynamics of
7the Dutch society, we suppose that in the future economists will need to take even more care of
the asymmetric wealth perceptions.
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81 Introduction
In the last three years several governmental ofﬁces and major economic institutions in Europe
have systematically failed to forecast the percentage change of real private consumption
expenditures relative to the previous year. According to the OECD Economic Outlooks in the
Netherlands in 2002 economists expected an increase of private consumption expenditures by
1.7% in 2003 and 2.7% in 2004. Dutch private consumption in 2003 has fallen by 0.9% and
preliminary 2004 ﬁgures show a modest increment by 0.1%1.
Why these large forecasting errors? And why an overestimation and not an underestimation?
This phenomenon is not common in the time series of private consumption forecasts, which is a
prominent item in the national accounts.
The most obvious consideration is that economists could not properly estimate the impact of
the economic difﬁculties that slowed down most industrialised economies and ﬁnancial markets
in the last few years. However larger recessions, for instance with more important repercussions
on the labour market, had not generated in the past decades such large discrepancies between
forecasts and realisations of private consumption. The most obvious explanation for the
forecasting error is that ﬁnancial markets are largely unpredictable, both in dimension and
returns. How ﬁnancial wealth will affect any economic variable is therefore difﬁcult to
anticipate. However good predictions about the size of the ﬁnancial markets may not be enough
to ﬁx our forecasting models.
If we pursue further at micro level the example of private consumption (which is however not
central in this study, as it will be clear soon) we may try to partly ‘translate’ this phenomenon
using the following argument. Since the mid 90’s more and more households have begun to
differentiate their ﬁnancial portfolio and have also allocated the positive returns of their
portfolios to consumption. The recent economic slow down has affected the (perceived) value of
these returns, and more in general of households’ assets. In turn this had a repercussion on
consumption levels that was unprecedented, because most households never invested on
ﬁnancial markets before.
Again this argument alone does not explain the failures by economists in forecasting
consumption. Indeed most governmental and international agencies do take into account the
elasticity of (household) consumption to (ﬁnancial) wealth in their forecasts. We need therefore
to get into the speciﬁcs of these models to understand what may have determined these recent
discrepancies.
Since this is an empirical study, and we will use data concerning the Netherlands as a study
case, let’s propose an example that will make our point clear. Two independent institutions in the
1 Germany, Portugal, Switzerland or Italy had a similar problem. See Annex Table 3 "Real private consumption
expenditures"OECD Economic Outlook no. 72 December 2002, no.74 December 2003, no.76 December 2004.
9Netherlands make forecasts of consumption growth: the Dutch Central Bank (DNB) and the
governmental agency Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB). Both agencies
have failed their consumption forecasts using different models. However a common feature of
both models is that the elasticity of consumption to wealth is calibrated and does not differ for
different levels of wealth. Moreover this elasticity is symmetric, in the sense that their models
assume that the effect of a variation in wealth will proportionally affect consumption, not
withstanding whether this variation in wealth is positive or negative.
This feature is common to models used also in other countries. The symmetry of this
elasticity may therefore be partly responsible for the forecasting errors quoted above (together
with the most general difﬁculty of assessing the size of the ﬁnancial market, which we don’t
discuss in this study). If individuals react more to negative developments of their wealth relative
to what they would do with positive variations, the wealth elasticity should be asymmetric. In
order to support this claim empirically we need to test whether individuals overreact to wealth
losses relative to their behaviour when wealth increases.
Since portfolio differentiation for a broad number of households is in most EU countries a
phenomenon of the last decade, we should constraint the analysis to this period and consider
older data as non informative. Evidently this poses a problem of sample dimension since
(ﬁnancial) wealth has increased steadily in virtually all industrialised countries in the last
decade, and only in the last two or three years we registered some decrements.
This implies that macro data contain insufﬁcient information to construct any reliable
estimation, even if we take into account multiple countries. This was already noted by Poterba
(2000) “the only way to learn more about these effects maybe by experiencing a downturn in
stock market value”. Nevertheless also the negative developments after the turn of the century do
not provide sufﬁcient information at country level. We have therefore decided to shift the
analysis to a micro level and to look at how individuals think about their wealth gains or losses.
Therefore our aim needs to be humble, in the sense that we only want to suggest a possible
operational direction in which to search for model improvements. In the remaining of this study
we aim therefore to test whether individuals react asymmetrically to wealth variations. We do
not aim to measure the difference in elasticities to consumption of different wealth changes. We
only want to test whether asymmetric reaction to wealth changes are plausible and suggest a
magnitude for this asymmetry. If we succeed, we believe that we have made a point to
recommend dropping symmetric elasticities of any economic variable to wealth in forecasting
models.
10We admit that the link between micro and macro will stay disjoint, however this is inevitable as
survey data measuring wealth typically fail to reproduce the wealth ﬁgures at macro level2.
The remaining of this study is organised as follows. In the next Section we describe the set up of
the analysis and the data. In Section 3 we present the non parametric tests based on reported
expectations and realisations of wealth changes. In Section 4 we present the models that are
needed to take into account several characteristics of the individuals that seem to be relevant
when describing the data. In Section 4.3 we also present a test that brieﬂy attempts a
quantiﬁcation of the effects under scrutiny. Two appendices are added. The ﬁrst one explains the
imputation of social security wealth. The second shows the ownership rate and the value of the
different items that compose net ﬁnancial wealth.
2 We observe for instance that multiplying the average household wealth hold in shares by the amount of households
present in the country, we make up approximately half of the value of shares registered by National Accounts. This feature
is common to almost all survey data that contain wealth information (see Alessie et al. (2000)). This is due to the fact that
the top percentiles of the wealth distribution are normally seriously underrepresented in survey data and the deﬁnition of
household in National Accounts is broader than in survey data.
11122 Set up and data
The aim of this study is to present some (non) parametric tests to understand whether individuals
are asymmetrically judging losses and gains in their ﬁnancial wealth. We position this study
within the micro econometric literature of consumer’s behaviour. We investigate therefore the
reaction of individuals to positive and negative shocks in their wealth, as derived from their
answers to categorial and subjective questions concerning wealth changes and from observed
wealth data. The use of subjective questions to evaluate asymmetric reactions is in line with
suggestions already proposed in the literature as wealth expectations are an indicator of
“consumer conﬁdence or the uncertainty that consumers perceive about future economic
conditions” Poterba (2000).
2.1 Set up
This study investigates whether many people fear an unexpected shock in their ﬁnancial situation
and how they evaluate wealth changes. We use Dutch panel data containing subjective
information on the respondents’ present expectations of household ﬁnances over the next year
and their subjective evaluation of the realised changes asked one year later. We show that, in
general, realised changes exceed expectations, and that this ﬁnding is extremely more evident
around age 65 (normal retirement age). This suggests that dissaving, as implied by the stripped
down version of the life cycle model without bequest and uncertainty, is mostly expected just
prior to retirement. In the analysis we will not ignore this retirement related pattern observed in
the data. Sudden changes over time to family composition and the occurrence of
labour-market-related shocks may also play a role and are therefore also considered. The data
also include reported ﬁnancial wealth, which will be used together with the subjectively
perceived wealth variation.
We begin our analysis by looking at the main trend over age of qualitative expectations and
realisation of ﬁnancial wealth. As these show interesting patterns around the age of retirement
we link this study to the literature that has studied consumer’s expectations and realisations over
the life cycle with different approaches. A peculiar coincidence which is worth noting is that
also at micro level expected changes in consumption, as derived by a standard Euler equation
model, overestimate realised patterns of consumption (after retirement). This is the well known
consumption-savings puzzle (Banks et al. (1998), Hamermesh (1984), Haider and StephensJr
(2004)). Again the literature indicates that after retirement this is a major and undisputable
phenomenon. More recently different studies have investigated directly reported expectations, as
we do in this study, rather than the ones derived from the standard model (BenitezSilva et al.
(2004), Mastrogiacomo (2005)). These studies recognise that most of the action takes place
around retirement as at that moment individuals experience an income shock and have
13accumulated higher wealth relative to younger groups. Studying expectations and realisations
allows one to understand whether individuals can for instance anticipate the drop in consumption
upon retirement. On this issue the literature is divided. Using data from a new survey, Ameriks
et al. (2002) show that many working households experience an unexpected fall in consumption
when they retire3. However, more recently, Hurd and Rohwedder (2003) have also analysed a
similar cross-section and claim that individuals anticipate properly the magnitude of the drop in
consumption. We will also use expectations and realisations data, but we do not ask ourselves
whether these suggest anticipation of future events. We want to understand whether these
variables indicate that individuals evaluate the future or the past ﬁnancial situation of the
household symmetrically. As our study looks at individual perceptions it also recalls ﬁndings in
the psychological-economic literature. Our ﬁndings point in the direction of the existence of an
endowment effect Knetsch (1989), and are also in line with the most common results in loss
aversion studies (for a summary see Rabin (1998)).
Our results are also in line with those reported in the wealth consumption literature that
investigates the asymmetric effect of wealth changes on consumption at macro level ( Poterba
(2000) Dynan and Maki (2001) , Case et al. (2003) Apergis and Miller (2004) ). The conclusions
of this stream of the literature suggest that though wealth effects on consumption are small these
may well be asymmetric. However these studies do not focus on household ﬁnancial situation
but rather on cross country analysis or time series analysis of ﬁnancial data.
The contribution of our study is therefore diverse. Thanks to our data we partly extend the
studies of Ameriks et al. (2002) and Hurd and Rohwedder (2003) because we use a panel data
set and account for individual effects. We tackle the question of whether individuals have an
asymmetric evaluation of their realised wealth changes relative to what they had expected, which
indirectly brings consumers’ conﬁdence into consideration. This can also be seen as a novel
contribution since most studies have looked at loss aversion effects in experimental settings or
cross country studies rather than using micro wealth data. Finally, as the literature has dedicated
much attention to the asymmetric behaviour of consumer, we will also try to quantify it using
wealth data for the Netherlands.
2.2 Data
We use the Dutch Social Economic Panel (SEP). It is administered by Statistics Netherlands
(CBS), and contains approximately 5000 households per year. In structure and contents, this
panel survey is similar to the German Social Economic Panel (GSOEP) and the American PSID.
3 Unfortunately, they only have a cross-section, and their respondents are only selected among highly-educated
academics. They divide the sample into two groups: the currently-employed and the currently-retired. Those who are
already retired report signiﬁcantly smaller falls in consumption as compared with those falls expected by respondents who
are still in work.
14The aim of the SEP is to provide a description of the most important elements of individual and
household welfare, and to monitor changes in these elements over time 4.
The sample includes non-self-employed respondents who have been in the survey in the period
1990 to 2001 (derivation of self-employed’s ﬁnancial wealth requires manipulations that we
found unreliable). We are therefore left with about 50000 observations5 . The sample selection is
reported in table 2.1.
Table 2.1 Steps of the Sample Selection
Initial amount of observations 60593
Reason for removal Removed Left
Full sample
Observed only once 1800 58793
Age panel inconsistent 24 58769
Year gaps 2277 56492
Item non response 11129 45363
Sub-sample
Age selection (50-70) 31071 14292
Explanatory note: The initial amount of observation is the result of appending the 12 year cross sections, only dropping item non
responses for age and year of birth. Further we keep only those present at least in two adjacent waves, that age of one year each year,
and where all waves are adjacent (year gaps are not allowed). Finally we drop those observations with item non responses on questions
like education and gender.
Source: SEP, own computations
In the SEP, the questions eliciting subjective expectations and realisations refer both to
‘household ﬁnancial situation’. As we observe all ﬁnancial items owned by each household we
can also quantify it. Hence, the question about expectations is: “ How do you think the ﬁnancial
situation of your household will develop in the next 12 months?” . It is answered by choosing
one of the ﬁve ordered categories listed from 1 to 5: “ signiﬁcantly worsen” , “ somewhat
worsen” , “ remain the same” , “ somewhat improve” , “ signiﬁcantly improve” 6. The question
about realisations has the same ﬁve ordered categories as possible answers and is formulated as
follows: “ How did your ﬁnancial situation develop in the last 12 months?” . The answers to
these two questions given by the head of the household are used in our study, that therefore
4 The SEP is representative of the Dutch population, but it excludes individuals living in special institutions such as
nursing homes. Statistics Netherlands applies a two-stage sampling procedure. Firstly, municipalities are drawn with
probability depending on the number of inhabitants (big cities are drawn with certainty). Next, addresses are selected
randomly. All households present at the selected address are interviewed, up to a maximum of 3 households. Over the
years 1984 to 1989, households were interviewed twice a year. Since 1990 the survey has been held annually.
5 For some pieces of analysis we only look at potential retirees aged 50 to 70 and in that case the sample consists of
approximately 15.000 observations.
6 “ Don’t know” answers are accepted but not used in this analysis.
15explores the head’s perception of household ﬁnances7.
Figure 2.1 shows the pattern of these variables according to the age of the head of the household.
After age 35, expectations tend to be lower than realisations, and typically also below 3, that is
the value indicating no change in household ﬁnances. Expectations and realisations decrease
with age, indicating that as time goes by individuals expect and experience their wealth changes
as being lower. In order to make the two lines comparable, we report expectations in period t −1
and realisations in t. This means that the pick down in the graph shows the low expectations
expressed at age 64 about ﬁnances the year after. The big gap between expectations and
realisations at that age, will be studied more carefully later on.




















































Explanatory note: Expectations are deﬁned over the next 12 months. The drop at age 65 is therefore reported when the
respondent is 64. Realisations are instead within the same wave and therefore these reported for age 65 are reported at
age 65. In this way the vertical difference between expectations and realisations refers to a comparison over the same
period. Expectations and Realisations are ordered from 1 to 5 where one stands for “large decrease” and 5 for “large
increase” .
Observations 56492. Period 1990-2001.
Source SEP, own computations.
For the moment, it is worth noting that at that age individuals stop receiving their salary or early
retirement beneﬁt and receive the combination of old age pension and occupational pension,
which means that their income may drop signiﬁcantly. Disposing of data concerning the
7 In two adults households with adults of different genders, Netherlands Statistics deﬁnes the man as "head". Households
with multiple heads had to be dropped.
16ﬁnancial position of households in each year we can also deﬁne their active savings as the delta
of their total ﬁnancial wealth Engelhardt (1995). These include therefore the variations of
checking and saving accounts, bonds, stocks and other ﬁnancial assets. In ﬁgure 2.2 we report
results of active savings according to the age of the head.

























Explanatory note: Active savings are deﬁned as the delta of net ﬁnancial wealth. This sums up checking and savings
accounts, savings certiﬁcates, bonds, stocks and other ﬁnancial assets. It also deducts the negative balance of checking
accounts, consumer credit, retail debt, pledge, debt with family, study loans and other debt. The negative values around
age 60 may be associated to early retirement phenomena. Period 1990-2001.
Source SEP, own computations.
A ﬁrst comparison of ﬁgures 2.1 and 2.2 shows that while in the monetary perception active
savings tend to increase with age, individuals evaluate these changes as lower. This is also a well
known phenomenon in the literature that economists label as diminishing sensitivity Kahneman
and Tversky (1979). Another possible explanation is that those experiencing losses in their
ﬁnancial wealth overreact in their subjective judgment relative to those who experience ﬁnancial
gains, that are milder in their positive evaluations. In addition the subjective evaluation of these
changes varies with age, with older respondents reporting lower outcomes, mostly when they get
closer to the age of retirement. We will take this into consideration.
17We extract from the data some covariates that may be linked to the two subjective responses to
ﬁnancial wealth changes. These are: time effects, taste shifters, shocks, ﬁnancial indicators and,
as anticipated, retirement indicators.
Time effects will control for macro-shocks common to all individuals over time. Taste
shifters will include the usual exogenous regressors, like education and family size.
Retirement indicators will detect the exact timing of retirement which is not observed
directly in the data, but that is relevant to our study (also to compare our results with the
literature above). In order to identify the potential early retirees, different deﬁnitions of (partial)
retirement are combined8.
Table 2.2 Future expectations of household ﬁnances around retirement
Different deﬁnitions relative to the head of the household
Expected category Value associated Self-reported Worked Income Old age Non-
with the category deﬁnition hours deﬁnition pensioners retirees
% % % % %
Big decrease 1 4 4 3 12 3
Decrease 2 18 18 16 29 12
Equal 3 71 67 74 46 67
Increase 4 7 9 7 11 17
Big increase 5 1 1 1 2 2
Observations 8730 946 1436 643 5090
Explanatory note: We include only respondents aged 50 to 70 and dispose of 14942 observations. The self reported deﬁnition is based
on a question concerning the main activity. Worked hours and Income deﬁnition refer to transitions over time consistent with retirement.
Old age pensioners are all those older than 65. Non retirees are not included in any of these categories.
Source: SEP, own computations
As shown in table 2.2, in which we select a subgroup of elderly individuals age 50 to 70,
individuals in any of the retirement categories that we combine have lower future expectations
relative to the others.
Financial indicators, changes in the family composition (like divorce and widowhood), in the
health status of the respondent or other household member are also extracted from the data and
used later in the analysis.
Among the ﬁnancial indicators, we introduce a proxy of social security wealth (SSW).
8 Respondents who retire in the year of observation (year t) are identiﬁed using the question about their main activity.
Then, using the amount of weekly working hours we deﬁne partial retirement as the status of those individuals for whom
participation drops at least by 25% of the working schedule relative to the panel observation in t −1. A third deﬁnition of
partial retirement looks at income sources, an individual is deﬁned as ‘retiring in panel wave t if he or she declares in t +1
an income for period t that is composed of 50% of retirement income, provided that the individual was working in period
t −1’. A fourth deﬁnition will mark the shift into old age pension (AOW) when respondents turn 65.
18Figure 2.3 Net Financial Wealth by cohort and age of the head of the household.








































after 1972 1967 - 71 1962 - 66 1957 - 61
1952 - 56 1947 - 51 1942 - 46 1937 - 41
1932 - 36 1927 - 31
Explanatory note: the horizontal ax shows the average cohort age of the head, for instance for the cohort 1932-1936
respondents are aged from 54 to 58 in 1990 and therefore we report age 56 as an average for this cohort in the ﬁrst year.
Source SEP, own computations.
Appendix A provides some details about the construction of this variable. This variable will be
introduced in the estimation to test whether individuals expecting a more generous pension
treatment, form higher expectations over the next year. Also income, active savings and ﬁnancial
wealth are introduced. In ﬁgure 2.3 we show the pattern of net ﬁnancial wealth according to age
for different cohorts. We deﬁne it as the difference between assets and liabilities9. If we abstract
from time effects, the vertical distance between each segment shows that in general, given age,
younger cohorts are richer. This ﬁgure is based again on the whole sample. After age 40 we see
that cohort effects are particularly evident, and that net ﬁnancial wealth is deﬁnitely higher
relative to the youngest cohorts.
9 For a more precise deﬁnition see Appendix B.
19203 Non parametric tests of asymmetry
When individuals answer the question about expectations of future ﬁnancial wealth they report a
location of their individual subjective distribution relative to a perspective event. As in Das and
Van Soest (2000) and Das et al. (1999) individuals with good anticipative skills should report a
location of their individual subjective distribution that coincides with the one relative to the
distribution of the realisation. This simple reasoning offers the possibility to check whether
individuals think ‘symmetrically’ about their future wealth. If so respondents should report a
symmetric location of their individual subjective distribution Mastrogiacomo (2005).
Therefore we compare subjective predictions with self-reported outcomes. Evidently such
comparison is not straightforward since there is no reason to expect that the distribution of
expectations across the population is the same as the distribution of the actual variable. Even
when realisations and predictions coincide the two variable are not comparable. While the
outcome is based on the distribution of the actual variable, expectations reﬂect some location of
the individual subjective distribution (mode, mean etc.). We will try to study such locations by
considering different models generating best predictions of the prospective realisations. One
could think of respondents minimizing a loss function. Respondents could for instance refer to
the modal category or to some quantile of the subjective distribution. In the ﬁrst case, when
confronted with the ﬁve ordered categories of the question, respondents could report the mode of
their subjective distribution. In the second instead, for instance, they could report the median.
The data contain questions eliciting expectations of outcome y = ﬁnancial situation; where
respondents may choose among ordered categories. Let f(y|s) be the subjective probability
density of outcome y given information s. Respondents choose one of the K categoriesC1,...,CK
of the formCk = (mk−1,mk], with −¥ = m0 < m1 < ... < mk−1 < mK = ¥. The threshold values
mk are subjectively determined and ordered models may be used to estimate their values. The
answer to the expectation question is denoted by p. The minimisation of some loss function will
return p (see formula 3.2). If the respondents answer the question having in mind the most likely





This corresponds to minimizing, with respect to k, the expected loss function: E1(y / ∈Ck)|s.
Here the behaviour of an individual forming some point expectations p∗ and choosing the
category p that contains p∗ is treated. The general form of the problem is minimizing the






p = k iff p∗ ∈Ck. (3.2)
If respondents interpret the question as eliciting the median of f(y|s) the relative loss function
will be L(u) = |u| while for the category containing the mean the loss function will be
L(u) = u2 Das et al. (1999).
If individuals are good predictors the categorised answer to the question about expectations
and to the question about realisations should mirror a location from the same distribution.
Assuming these distributions are normal10, if individuals are “symmetrical” this location should
be either the mode, the median or the mean of such individual distribution. By comparing
expectations and outcomes we perform the following tests to show that what individuals report
may not be any of those locations. This will therefore test whether expectations of ﬁnancial
wealth are symmetric.
10 Or more in general symmetrical and unimodal.
22Table 3.1 Tests for Modal Category and Median Category Assumption
Modal category assumption Median category assumption
P{ci = k|xi,pi = k} ≥ P{ci = j|xi,pi = k} P{ci < k|pi = k} P{ci > k|pi = k}
c=1 c=2 c=3 c=4 c=5 lower upper lower upper
% % % % % % % % %
k=1 90 - 91 22 23 39 10 6 . . 70 86
strong 91 - 92 31 31 27 8 2 . . 62 76
decrease 92 - 93 37 24 24 10 6 . . 55 71
93 - 94 31 29 30 8 3 . . 63 75
94 - 95 31 28 29 10 2 . . 64 75
95 - 96 35 21 30 9 4 . . 58 71
96 - 97 34 26 28 9 3 . . 60 73
97 - 98 28 27 25 13 8 . . 65 78
98 - 99 23 25 32 13 7 . . 70 84
99 - 00 25 20 32 16 7 . . 66 83
00 - 01 31 27 23 12 8 . . 61 78
k=2 90 - 91 14 30 44 8 4 11 17 52 60
decrease 91 - 92 12 29 45 11 4 10 14 56 62
92 - 93 11 35 43 9 2 9 13 51 57
93 - 94 10 35 41 10 2 9 12 51 57
94 - 95 10 31 47 10 3 8 11 57 62
95 - 96 12 31 44 10 3 10 14 54 60
96 - 97 9 31 44 14 3 7 11 57 64
97 - 98 8 25 46 17 4 6 10 63 70
98 - 99 7 31 42 15 5 5 10 57 65
99 - 00 7 27 41 21 4 5 9 62 70
00 - 01 8 26 37 21 7 6 11 61 70
k=3 90 - 91 4 12 62 18 4 15 17 21 24
no 91 - 92 4 15 61 16 4 18 20 19 21
change 92 - 93 3 17 60 16 3 20 22 18 21
93 - 94 4 17 59 17 2 20 23 18 21
94 - 95 4 13 64 16 3 16 18 17 20
95 - 96 4 17 61 15 3 20 22 17 19
96 - 97 3 14 61 18 3 16 18 20 23
97 - 98 3 10 59 23 5 12 14 26 29
98 - 99 3 11 63 20 3 12 15 22 25
99 - 00 2 9 59 24 5 11 13 27 30
00 - 01 3 12 53 28 4 14 16 30 33
k=4 90 - 91 4 8 41 33 14 50 56 12 16
increase 91 - 92 5 11 40 32 13 53 59 11 15
92 - 93 2 14 42 33 9 55 61 7 11
93 - 94 6 15 36 34 9 54 60 7 10
94 - 95 4 13 38 36 9 51 57 7 11
95 - 96 4 14 35 38 9 50 56 7 11
96 - 97 4 11 36 38 12 48 54 10 13
97 - 98 3 8 34 43 12 42 48 10 14
98 - 99 2 10 32 45 11 41 47 9 12
99 - 00 3 6 29 47 16 35 40 14 18
00 - 01 2 7 24 50 17 31 36 15 19
23Table 3.1 Tests for Modal Category and Median Category Assumption (continued)
c=1 c=2 c=3 c=4 c=5 lower upper lower upper
k=5 90 - 91 4 8 22 34 32 61 75 . .
strong 91 - 92 6 5 35 22 32 61 75 . .
increase 92 - 93 7 12 24 27 29 64 77 . .
93 - 94 4 11 28 28 30 63 78 . .
94 - 95 8 13 25 25 29 64 78 . .
95 - 96 8 8 28 29 27 67 79 . .
96 - 97 5 9 24 33 29 65 77 . .
97 - 98 3 6 26 25 41 53 66 . .
98 - 99 4 9 23 34 30 64 75 . .
99 - 00 2 5 18 32 43 51 63 . .
00 - 01 4 7 19 30 39 55 67 . .
Explanatory note: k = predicted category, c = realised category. Respondents are selected when participating for 2 consecutive years in
the survey.
Source SEP: own computations.
3.1 Modal category
Following Das et al. (1999) we formalise the modal category assumption for individual i , given
the available information xi, as:
P{ci = k|xi,pi = k} ≥ P{ci = j|xi,pi = k}, j = 1,...,K (3.3)
Where ci is the realised category and k is the predicted category. For those individuals with
pi = k most outcomes will be located in category k. Realisations, in the best-case scenario, are
based upon drawings from the same distribution leading to probabilities 3.3. We can use
observations of ci to see whether 3.3 holds. Deﬁne for notational convenience
Pj ≡ Pci = j|xi,pi = k. Let ˆ Pj be the sample equivalent of Pj
11. Under the hypothesis of the
independence of realisations , frequencies of ﬁnancial situation can be used to estimate the
probabilities in 3.3. Assuming xi = year of observation table 3.1 reports the frequencies.
Table 3.1 shows that only for the case k = 3 the modal category assumption could be used as
a model generating expectations. For k = 2 for instance this is never true. Globally 30 cases out
of 55 behave according to the modal category assumption12.
11 That is the number of observations with c = j and pi = k and the given value of xi.
12 We have also estimated table 3.1 conditional on several covariates of xi such as gender and education. The results are
conﬁrmed.
243.2 Median category
If the survey responses corresponds to a category that contains a point prediction that minimises
a loss function, it is natural to interpret pi as containing the α-quantile of the respondent’s
subjective distribution of yi. For α = 0.5 the category is the one containing the median. If p∗
i is
the α-quantile (corresponding, for convenience, to the cumulative probability α) than in the best
case scenario it must be:
P{yi − p∗
i ≤ 0|xi} = α (3.4)
Since we observe the category ci , we focus on the case with ci = k. Then:
P{ci ≤ k −1|si,pi = k} < α ≤ P{ci ≤ k|si,pi = k}
that implies the following inequalities:
P{ci > k|xi,pi = k} ≤ 1−α (3.5)
P{ci < k|xi,pi = k} < α (3.6)
To ﬁt in the best case scenario the α-quantile of ci must fall in category k, given that pi = k; with
no more than 100 α% of realised values in lower categories and no more than 100 (1−α)% in
higher categories. A test for 3.5 and 3.6 is reported in the right panel of table 3.1 using the data






























Where n is the number of observations and xi is only includes year of observation. In the table
the value of α = 0.5 should be included in the conﬁdence intervals in order to conclude that
individuals are reporting a median as a point expectation.
This test uses the ordering of the categories. This suggests that the assumption required for
the modal category case were less stringent. For the case of α = 0.5 we see that 3.5 and 3.6 for
all k do not imply that 3.4 holds for all k and j , and vice versa. It is though true that for the
extreme values of the k categories the inequalities 3.5 and 3.6 will hold (namely for k = 1, that is
the ﬁrst category, (3.5) implies (3.4), while for the last category k = K = 5, (3.6) implies
(3.4)).. Such test imposes that an absolute majority should fall into a certain category, rather
than a relative majority as in the modal case. In this sense the median category assumption is
more restrictive and it does not come as a surprise that the results are poor in terms of predictive
capacity.
253.3 Mean category
When the loss function is L(u) = u2, than pi reﬂects the category containing the mean. To test
this implication we need the rich data that in the SEP approximates the concept of yi rather than
the ordered category ci. We use net ﬁnancial wealth as a proxy of household ﬁnancial condition
as mentioned in the question eliciting ci.
In this case the answer pi is the category containing E{yi|xi}. When pi = k, then p∗ will fall
within two adjacent thresholds (mk−1 and mk1). That is:
E{yi|xi,pi = k} ∈ (mk−1,i,mk,i].
In table 3.2, xi is deﬁned by gender to keep the amount of observations higher in any cell.
In table 3.2 standard deviation increases with k in the case of females, but not the sample
means, as we would expect. For males instead the sample means are conveniently ordered. Also
this table produces mixed results. This could depend on the deﬁnition of y that we adopt (that for
instance does not include housing wealth). More likely it suggests that also other covariates, and
not only gender, may be related to ﬁnancial wealth and affect m. Overall none of the three
hypothesis tested produce convincing results in terms of respondents symmetry, probably
indicating that individuals may actually be minimizing asymmetric loss functions that attach
more weight to lower expectations categories (which would indicate asymmetry). However our
computations may have been too simple, as these only condition on one observable. A
multivariate analysis is therefore a logical extension. Ordered models can be estimated that also
estimate the thresholds between reported categories. We can study the relative distance between
these thresholds to test the presence of asymmetry. This will be done in the next two sections.
26Table 3.2 Test of Mean Category Assumption
Value of household ﬁnancial situation in the last 12 months
Subjective Observed Standard Observations
evaluation ﬁnancial wealth deviation
changes
Male Large decrease − 4125 71038 2129
Decrease − 212 69730 6433
Equal 1327 82147 22591
Increase 4850 76810 10504
Large increase 10554 97077 3153
Female Large decrease − 1188 41338 882
Decrease − 2771 38694 2056
Equal 893 54755 6144
Increase 3567 28650 1997
Large increase 4821 38631 473
Observations 56362
Explanatory note: The table reports the difference in the value of ﬁnancial wealth in two adjacent years. In this table the sample is not
selected on age and item non responses. We have also dropped 130 outliers.
Source: SEP, own computations
27284 Parametric approach
We have seen above that expectations and realisations of ﬁnancial wealth may depend on a
multiplicity of factors. Age, the business cycle or the occurrence of retirement have already been
quoted. Such a multivariate analysis is difﬁcult to handle non parametrically, but can easily be
implemented in an ordered model. This is the aim of the tests reported in this section. Some
regressors that we will introduce, have not been mentioned yet. Income shocks are derived from
two subjective questions that identify a mismatch between expected income increases and
realised income decreases in household income in the last 12 months. These may well be related
to the perception of realised and expected wealth changes. For the same reason also household
income is introduced as the sum of the non capital income of all household members. Health
shocks to the respondent or family members are derived from self reported information
contained in the data and we expect these to be inversely related to ﬁnancial expectations and
realisations. Changes in family status over time (like divorce or widowhood) are derived
exploiting marital status information over adjacent waves. Social security and pension wealth is
imputed, details are available in Appendix A. We include this variable separately in order to
understand whether individual perceive pension wealth as a component of their current ﬁnancial
situation. The construction of net ﬁnancial wealth is explained in Appendix B. Active saving is
deﬁned as the ﬁrst difference over time of liquid wealth. We expect these two ﬁnancial indicators
to be highly correlated to the qualitative evaluation of household ﬁnances. This set of variables
will be included in the multivariate analysis together with some endogenous variables, like the
individual mean of the ﬁnancial indicators over the observation period.
4.1 Model
The parametric test will be based on the estimation of a model for the categorised answer to the
expectations and realisations questions. We will carry out some Wald tests on the estimated
parameters and some computations in order to test asymmetrical responses. Therefore in the
models, yi,t denotes in turn the categorised answer to the question about expectations, the one
about realisations as well as their difference13. As in a standard ordered response model, the
dependent variable is related to the underlying latent variable y∗
i,t in the following way:
yi,t = j if (mj−1 < y∗
i,t ≤ mj) j = 1,...,4. (4.1)
The boundaries −¥ = m0 < m1 < ... < m4 < m5 = ¥ are constant across individuals and will be
estimated.
13 As the difference between the two ordered variables has 9 possible values we summarise the extreme categories and
generate a variable with only 5 categories.
29The underlying latent variable is modeled by the equation:
y∗
i,t = β0
0xi,t +λt + ˜ αi +ui,t i = 1,...,N, t = 1,...,T, (4.2)
where xi,t is a vector of taste shifters reﬂecting, for example, education, gender and family
composition. Time effects λt are included to allow for macro-shocks, common to all respondents
and not varying with xi,t. The parameter ˜ αi is an individual speciﬁc (random) effect indicating
unobserved heterogeneity across individuals.
The white noise, which is the individual time-speciﬁc error term ui,t, is normally distributed
and independent of the regressors xi,t and of the individual effect ˜ αi. The latter is treated as a
random effect. We allow for an underlying correlation in Mundlak form Mundlak (1978). This
means that the relation between ˜ αi and xi,t is speciﬁed as ˜ αi = αi +β0
1 ¯ xi. In ¯ xi only those
variables expected to be correlated with ˜ αi are included.
4.2 Results
Table 4.1 shows the model results. It shows probit coefﬁcients and not marginal effects.
Signiﬁcant parameters are highlighted.
The left panel of the table contains results for the model in which qualitative realisations in t
are the dependent variable (Models 1 and 2). In the second model we drop the shock indicators
as one may doubt that some family related events occurred as completely unexpected. We
describe the results of Models 1 and 2 together. The time effects are signiﬁcant and indicate that
after 1991 individuals perceived a decline in their ﬁnancial wealth. This follows the business
cycle as, beginning with 1998 (please notice that in 1998 individuals report the development of
their wealth in 1997), individuals experienced qualitative improvements in their ﬁnancial wealth.
Taste shifters are also generally signiﬁcant though the effect of owning to an age-cohort14 gets
very small when we drop the shock indicators. Male heads report having experienced lower
ﬁnancial wealth in the last year, as lower educated heads do or heads of larger households.
Retirement indicators should capture the effect of retirement on wealth changes as this is a basic
relation in the standard life-cycle model. However, as we do not observe retirement directly, we
imputed it in 4 different ways and combined these deﬁnition in one indicator (see above). All
coefﬁcients are signiﬁcant and negative. The effect of retirement (which occurs in any case at
age 65) can be derived from the sum of the three indicators included. Such effect is therefore
negative. Two of those indicators interact with (are multiplied by) the educational level and show
that higher educated retirees tend to perceive lower ﬁnancial wealth changes. This means that
overall entering retirement is inversely related to outcomes of ﬁnancial wealth, and that this is
14 We have also attempted an estimation with an age polynomial and the results did not change signiﬁcantly. However
since the deﬁnition of retirement is highly correlated to age we prefer to show results with year of birth cohorts.
30more so for lower educated individuals. This may therefore suggest that individuals begin to
perceive some dissaving after retirement. The observed income shock is derived by the questions
eliciting expectations and realisations of household income and is, as expected, negative and
signiﬁcant. Perception of ﬁnancial wealth development also lowers when a member of the
family gets into health problems or exits the households. Among the ﬁnancial indicators,
pension wealth and active savings are signiﬁcant. The latter is deﬁned as the ﬁrst difference
(over time) of net ﬁnancial wealth. It shows a positive effect in line with our expectations.
Pension wealth, which we impute on the base of income proﬁles and institutional rules, has a
negative impact on perceived wealth changes. As this is counterintuitive it may indicate that
individuals do not include pension wealth in their perception of household ﬁnancial wealth.
Among the endogenous variables, that are those variables correlated to the unobservable
individual effects, household income, social security wealth and net present ﬁnancial wealth
have a positive and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient. This means that those unobservables that are
correlated to these household characteristics are also positively correlated to the perceived
realisations of ﬁnancial situation. Finally the table also reports the estimated thresholds and the
standard deviation of the simulated individual effect. The simulated individual effect, that brings
unobserved heterogeneity in the model, is signiﬁcant and positive.
We will use the estimates of Model 1 in the computation of some tests later on.
31Table 4.1 Multivariate analysis
Qualitative realisations Expectations Expectations minus
realisations
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Coeff Coeff Coeff Coeff Coeff Coeff
Time effects
Year 1992 − 0.099* − 0.114* − 0.001 − 0.001 0.006 0.022
Year 1993 − 0.167* − 0.154* − 0.136* − 0.135* 0.074* 0.076*
Year 1994 − 0.196* − 0.219* − 0.111* − 0.135* 0.008 0.018
Year 1995 − 0.166* − 0.157* − 0.025 − 0.035 − 0.040 − 0.038
Year 1996 − 0.217* − 0.170* − 0.009 − 0.015 0.076* 0.060*
Year 1997 − 0.113* − 0.070* 0.099* 0.093* − 0.022 − 0.036
Year 1998 0.095* 0.125* 0.234* 0.227* − 0.116* − 0.128*
Year 1999 0.040 0.083* 0.245* 0.239* 0.022 0.004
Year 2000 0.173* 0.224* 0.319* 0.313* − 0.102* − 0.124*
Year 2001 0.204* 0.247* 0.244* 0.238* − 0.082* − 0.098*
Taste shifters
Cohort head − 0.018* 0.002* − 0.005* − 0.005* − 0.001 − 0.004*
Male head − 0.109* − 0.112* − 0.062* − 0.064* 0.017 0.021
Family size − 0.031* − 0.023* 0.049* 0.044* − 0.009 − 0.016
Intermediate education head 0.086* 0.071* 0.048* 0.048* − 0.033* − 0.026
Higher education head 0.189* 0.173* 0.041* 0.041* − 0.112* − 0.103*
Experience head − 0.008* − 0.010* − 0.015* − 0.015* − 0.003* − 0.001
Head’s retirement indicators between t-1 and t
Retiree − 0.226* − 0.329* − 0.187* − 0.194* 0.023 0.095*
Retiree* Intermediate education − 0.075* − 0.086* 0.045 0.044* 0.077* 0.082*
Retiree* Higher education − 0.137* − 0.138* 0.061* 0.060* 0.089* 0.087*
Observed micro-shocks
Income shock − 2.119* − 0.087* 1.134*
Health shock 0.021 − 0.005 − 0.015
Family member becomes not self-sufﬁcient in t − 0.134* − 0.100* − 0.006*
Head becomes divorced or widow in t − 0.524* 0.039 0.359*
Financial indicators
Social security and pension wealth (head) − 0.013* − 0.017* − 0.013* − 0.014* 0.010 0.014*
Household net ﬁnancial wealth − 0.088 − 0.149 − 0.301* − 0.308* − 0.071 − 0.022
Net household income 0.250 0.221 − 0.632* − 0.635* − 0.388* − 0.385*
Active savings 0.507* 0.498* 0.118 0.119* − 0.289 − 0.300*
Endogenous variables
Mean family size − 0.017 − 0.028* − 0.100* − 0.099* 0.005 0.012
Mean SSW 0.018* 0.024* 0.027* 0.027* − 0.009 − 0.014*
Mean net ﬁnancial wealth 0.365* 0.434* 0.114 0.123 − 0.238 − 0.298*
Mean household income 1.655* 1.510* 2.292* 2.296* 0.073 0.103
Mean active savings 0.096 0.096 0.203 0.201 − 0.024 − 0.032
32Table 4.1 Multivariate analysis (continued)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Coeff Coeff Coeff Coeff Coeff Coeff
Other statistics
m1 − 2.477* − 2.074* − 2.531* − 2.529* − 1.734* − 1.845*
m2 − 1.446* − 1.241* − 1.595* − 1.595* − 0.768* − 0.884*
m3 0.101 0.231* 0.283* 0.283* 0.646* 0.504*
m4 1.156* 1.272* 1.422* 1.423* 1.533* 1.342*
σα 0.118* 0.126* − 0.065 − 0.064 − 0.097 − 0.105
Log likelihood − 53510 − 56701 − 47581 − 47598 − 57886 − 58944
Observations 45363
Explanatory note: The variables excluded are: Year 1991, Lower education, Lower education*Retiree, Female head. The retirement and
shock indicators are deﬁned as a transition between year t −1 and t. Cohort head is a ordered variable deﬁned in the interval 1(young
cohort) to 10 (older cohort). Asterisks indicate signiﬁcance at conventional level. The unbalanced panel looses approximately 11000
observations due to item non responses on several regressors.
Source: SEP, own computations
Model 3 and 4 show results for the estimation with expectations as a dependent variable.
Dropping shocks does not signiﬁcantly affect the model performance. Time effects are in general
signiﬁcant and follow the same business cycle-related pattern as in models 1 and 2. The analysis
of the coefﬁcients relative to the taste shifters shows that older cohorts have lower expectations
in terms of household ﬁnances. The same is true for male heads and for low educated
respondents. All signiﬁcant retirement indicators are negative. The old age indicators also reveal
that higher educated respondents have lower ﬁnancial expectations relative to the low educated.
Experienced income shocks affect negatively expectations over the future, like a family member
who becomes non-self-sufﬁcient. Among the ﬁnancial indicators SSW is negatively correlated
to the dependent variable. Those unobservables correlated to income are also correlated to
higher expectations. The individual effect’s standard deviation is not signiﬁcant.
We employ these estimates to explain what generates the expectations drop at age 64. We want
to understand whether the large drop in expectations at age 64 shown in ﬁgure 2.1, is mostly
determined by retirement. We use the results of Model 3 to enquiry this further. We decompose
the observed drop in expectations of individuals eligible for old age pension as determined by
two different effects. The ﬁrst effect is determined by all individual characteristics, the second
exclusively by eligibility for old age beneﬁt (e). In order to identify these two effects, an
Oaxaca-alike decomposition is computed.
In order to isolate the effect of eligibility, which enters the model with some indicators (de),
the following steps are followed. First, the estimates of Model 3 are used to predict the mean
value of expectations (y) for those who are not eligible (E(ye=0|de = 0)), separately from those
who are eligible (E(ye=1|de = 1)) . For this second group, which is aged 64 in t −1, a second
prediction is computed, the same as the previous one, but dropping the eligibility indicator
33(E(ye=1|de = 0)).
In this way, the overall effect E(ye=0|de = 0)−E(ye=1|de = 1) is decomposed into two
effects:
[E(ye=0|de = 0)−E(ye=1|de = 0)]
| {z }
characteristics




where the second term of 4.3 identiﬁes the effect of the eligibility indicators on average
expectations, since these are the only parameters that differ between the two predicted values.
In the observed data, expectations drop at age 64 from 2.87 to 2.61. The result of the
decomposition15 indicates that individual characteristics account for an average drop of 0.16,
while eligibility indicators account for the remaining drop of 0.09. This means that 36% of the
drop in expectations is attributable to an eligibility effect, while the remaining 64% may be
attributed to all other characteristics together.
The right panel of table 4.1 is reserved to Models 5 and 6. The dependent variable is the
difference between expectations and realisations. As explained in the introduction several
researches have looked at similar variables to study whether individuals are able to anticipate
future events. We estimate these models as a reference to this literature. In order to produce this
table we have generated a new dependent variable. The original 9 possible categories (from -4 to
4, including zero) have been reduced to 5 by grouping the extreme values -4,-3,-2 and 2,3,4. The
variable is then re-coded from 1 to 5, where 1 stands for “expectations a lot lower than
realisations”; 2 stands for “expectations somewhat lower than realisations”; 3 stands for
“expectations equal to realisations”; 4 stands for “expectations somewhat higher than
realisations”; and 5 stands for “expectations a lot higher than realisations”. This means that the
higher the dependent variable, the more unjustiﬁably optimistic the respondent. Of course
interpreting the estimated coefﬁcients is complicated since a unitary positive difference between
expectations and realisations may both mark a shift between an expected large ﬁnancial gain and
an experienced small ﬁnancial gain, as well as a shift between an expected small loss and an
experienced large loss. This means that our dependent variable may have the same value for
experienced small gains or large losses and does not capture the fact that overestimating a gain
may well be a different story than underestimating a loss. Nevertheless it may still be interesting
to understand whether there is any speciﬁc determinant of the mismatch. The table shows that
older cohorts’ individuals are more unjustiﬁably pessimistic, as we had seen in the descriptive
analysis. The retirement status itself did not turn out to be signiﬁcant when we also account for
shocks (income shocks may well be related to retirement of course). If we omit the shock
indicators the retirement indicator gets a signiﬁcant positive effect. This indicates that
15 We compute this on a more homogeneous sample of individuals aged 50 to 70, who may actually qualify for retirement.
34respondents are around retirement unjustiﬁably optimistic, which seems counterintuitive when
compared to the descriptive statistics. Income shocks are also positively related to the dependent
variable, but again these positive effects may well be correlated to the underestimation of a loss
rather than the overestimation of a gain. The main result of these last two models is actually that
not all observed characteristics are insigniﬁcant. This suggests that individuals have taken
certain individual characteristics into account when forming their ﬁnancial plans but not all. One
could claim that if a characteristic is a signiﬁcant determinant of the mismatch, it has not
properly been taken into account when forming expectations (Disney and Tanner (1999),
Mastrogiacomo (2005)). If it had it would not explain a mismatch, but a matching. This of
course if we assume out that the mismatch may be determined elsewhere.
In the remaining of the study we do not analyse this mismatch further, as the anticipative
behaviour of respondents is not the object of this study. We exploit the complete version of the
model with realisations (Model 1) to explain the main implications that we have discussed.
4.3 Parametric tests
The estimation of Model 1 delivers also the four thresholds mj (j = 1...4). We have performed
some basic tests on these parameters and their sequence, that are summarised in table 4.2. This
is a common approach in the literature that studies market entry thresholds (see for instance
Bresnahan and Reiss (1991)), which is hardly ever used to describe consumers’ perceptions.
In the table we show the thresholds and the results of some tests (for the whole sample or when
we disaggregate by educational level). We have tested whether there are signiﬁcant differences
in the thresholds within different educational levels. Overall we reject the null hypothesis of
these tests for all cases with exception of the last. Also the symmetric case m2+m3 = 0 is
overall rejected. We have also tested whether there are differences between the thresholds across
the educations groups (we don’t show these tests in the table). For this second series of tests we
can always reject the null hypothesis of the thresholds being jointly equal across the different
groups (χ2
(8) = 40.2). Though if we test the thresholds separately in some cases we reject the null
at 5% conﬁdence level. However we can’t always reject it at a 1% level.
4.4 Extent of the asymmetry
The results of the tests indicate that in general the thresholds are not arranged symmetrically
between positive and negative wealth changes. This seems to be the case in particular for
households in which the head has an intermediate level of education. However we are silent
about the extent of the asymmetry that we may be facing. Nor the estimated thresholds
themselves give sufﬁcient information, being those auxiliary parameters that do not yet have a
direct economic interpretation. Measuring this asymmetry requires possibly a study of its own,
35Table 4.2 Test of model estimated thresholds
Education of the head of the household
Elementary Intermediate Higher All levels
m1 − 2.46 − 2.26 − 2.97 − 2.48
m2 − 1.37 − 1.23 − 2.04 − 1.45
m3 0.38 0.26 − 0.69 0.10
m4 1.43 1.35 0.35 1.16
Chi Square (1)
Test m1 = m2 2986.06 3011.99 1534.11 7539.96
Test m2 = −m3 12.89 12.07 61.85 65.94
Test m3 = m4 2915 5572 3928 12424
Test m1 = −m4 13.91 10.67 57.02 63.45
Test m2−m1 = m3−m2 606.43 371.65 187.40 1115.68
Test m3−m2 = m4−m3 703.82 385.10 156.70 1320.19
Test m2−m1 = m4−m3 2.07* 5.62 13.19 2.47*
Observations 15858 18793 10985 45636
Explanatory note: The upper part of the table reports the values of the thresholds when we estimate the model selecting different
education levels. In the lower part numbers with asterisks are values of the χ2 that do not allow rejection of the null hypothesis
being tested. The unbalanced panel looses approximately 11000 observations due to item non responses on several
regressors.
Source: SEP, own computations
which is the aim of a joint CPB-DNB project currently still in progress, and that is not possible
to carry out on the SEP data as these do not contain information on consumption. However the
estimated model (Model 1) allows us to infer what one could expect from such a study. We




1zi,t +λt + ˜ αi +ui,t i = 1,...,N, t = 1,...,T, (4.4)
yi,t = j if (mj−1 < β0
0qi,t +β0
1zi,t +λt + ˜ αi +ui,t ≤ mj) j = 1,...,4.
where q is a vector, subset of x , that does not include active savings (z). We deﬁne active
savings as the difference in net ﬁnancial wealth between t and t −1 (therefore this deﬁnition also
includes assets appreciation, but excludes income items such as dividends). As we estimate the
model in the form of an order probit we can rewrite the model, simplifying the notation, as:




















36where the mj thresholds are estimated. We are interested in the average value of z corresponding
to the mj (j = 1,...,4) thresholds. This is not difﬁcult to compute as we observe j and can invert
equation 4.6 once P(yi,t = j) has been estimated. For each observation we replace then the
corresponding zi,t . We can normalise m1 = 0 and rewrite the estimated probability of the ﬁrst
outcome as







As the ordered probit is based on normality we can rewrite 4.7 as
F−1(P(yi,t = 1)) = −β0
0qi,t +β0
1zi,t (4.8)
as the P(yi,t = 1) is estimated and therefore known we can compute zj=1, that is the average
value of z corresponding to alternative j = 1. We can work out the computations in 4.6 in a more
general form in order to derive:
zj =








where P(yi,t = j) are predicted by the model, the beta’s and the thresholds are estimated, and the
rest is known (¯ qi,t is the sample mean value). However we are not interested in the thresholds
themselves, but in the relation between thresholds separating positive and negative changes in
wealth. We deﬁne the ratio s =
z3
−z2, which we call the symmetry ratio16. Though this is a new
concept it is intuitive that if individuals were symmetrically evaluating decreases and increases
in their wealth, s would be 1. This would for instance mean that a small negative variation and a
small positive variation would amount to the same value (with opposite sign of course).
However if the symmetry ratio is larger (say s = 2) it means that the amount of wealth necessary
to identify a small increase is twice as large as the sum needed to report a small decrease. In
table 4.3 we show the value of the symmetry ratio for the whole sample and when we take into
account some age-related sub-samples.
The table shows that, made 1 the amount qualifying a small decrease, an average individual
needs 1.5 the same amount in order to report a small increase in ﬁnancial wealth. This is very
much in line with other ﬁndings in the endowment effect literature17(see Kahneman et al. (1990)
and Tversky and Kahneman (1991) ) that ﬁnds a relation between gains and losses
approximately equal to 2. We also ﬁnd that the symmetry ratio increases with age.
16 The second threshold separates the perception "no change in ﬁnancial wealth"from the perception "little decrease".
The third threshold instead separates "no change"and "little increase". The translation of the thresholds in terms of
ﬁnancial wealth-changes (active savings) quantiﬁes therefore the asymmetry that we have so far suspected.
17 Contrary to these studies however we make use of survey data and not experimental evidence.
37Table 4.3 The symmetry ratio over age






Explanatory note: We deﬁne the symmetry ratio as the ratio between the threshold separating no change in ﬁnancial wealth from a small
increase, over the threshold separating no change in ﬁnancial wealth from a small decrease. The thresholds are transformed from their
parameters value to a wealth value using the probabilities predicted after the estimation of the order probit model.
Source: SEP, own computations
The other interesting symmetry ratio would be
z4
−z1. However the amount of respondents
reporting "large increases"of their wealth is unfortunately to small to get a reliable estimate of z4.
38Appendix A SSW
The present discounted value of future incomes and beneﬁts is included as a RHS variable in the
ordered probit model (SSW). This variable is derived under several assumptions concerning both
the behaviour of individuals towards the pension system and the evolution of their income proﬁle
till age 100.
Previous research demonstrates that the institutional and ﬁnancial incentives related to ER
are so favourable in the Netherlands that the vast majority of individuals who are eligible for ER
do actually opt out as soon as they become eligible (see e.g. Mastrogiacomo et al. (2004)).
Unfortunately in the SEP the ER entitlement age is not observed. That is why we roughly impute
it. We assume that civil servants will retire at age 60 and private sector employees at age 62,
unless they will fulﬁl the maximum requirements (40 years of contribution) at younger ages. For
those currently older than 62 we assume that they will retire next period, if maximum
requirements are fulﬁlled. We keep labour income constant at current level and compute
pensions following the standard formula. We compute therefore the following present












AOW +min(40,ten−t −τ)∗1.75%∗(wt − fra).
In the formula τ is the current period. Further τ <V < R < T,V is the age of eligibility to an
early retirement beneﬁt (VUT), R is the year in which one turns 65 and becomes eligible to the
old age beneﬁt (AOW), w is the current salary and fra is the free part of the salary that does not
enter the computation of the employment pension and is closely related to the level of the AOW.
We use a discount rate of 2% (not shown in the formula).
3940Appendix B Net ﬁnancial wealth
The computation of net ﬁnancial wealth is described in table B.1, while table B.2 shows the
ownership rates of assets and liabilities in the SEP.
Table B.1 Assets and liabilities in guilders per year by age of the head of the household
Under 30 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 80-100
Total ﬁnancial assets 14589 27446 33124 43104 45637 45054 43015
Checking and saving accounts 11893 18994 22329 29063 32870 34219 30454
Positive balance checking accounts 2973 4375 5299 6233 6183 6779 7571
Saving accounts 10610 17466 19988 27169 32872 36700 37749
Saving certiﬁcates 9162 11857 15769 20608 26310 30772 14340
Bonds 15952 22502 21534 27989 44417 44781 53664
Stocks 16617 34016 43130 48561 53612 66879 98083
Other ﬁnancial assets 8730 18706 21587 30015 35670 51653 54408
Total ﬁnancial debt 9869 13819 14494 14192 12493 7386 4156
Negative balance checking accounts 998 2017 3627 3325 2913 3265 2908
Consumer credit 8879 11792 13284 13434 12040 8576 9433
Retail debt 1088 1369 1364 1324 1568 1737 764
Debt for public support 5955 7829 8964 7856 8950 8017 2250
Pledge . . 30815 29689 . . .
With other family members 6312 13759 14733 9565 15404 5194 .
Study loans 10150 13549 7580 6437 . . .
Other debt 12398 22215 21997 33235 27265 . .
Explanatory note: Figures are in Dutch guilders non-deﬂated. Sample period 1990-2001. The ﬁrst and last percentile the ﬁnancial wealth
distribution is dropped in order to avoid the presence of outliers.
Source: SEP, own computations
41Table B.2 Assets and liabilities ownership rate by age of the head of the household
Under 30 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 80-100
% % % % % % %
Total ﬁnancial assets 93 94 94 94 94 96 94
Checking and saving accounts 92 93 93 93 94 95 94
Positive balance checking accounts 82 86 88 88 91 93 92
Saving accounts 77 77 77 75 73 69 57
Saving certiﬁcates 3 3 4 5 5 3 1
Bonds and Stocks 10 17 19 21 18 13 12
Bonds 1 3 3 5 6 6 7
Stocks 9 16 18 19 15 11 8
Other assets 9 11 11 10 7 4 4
Total ﬁnancial debt 47 38 35 30 16 6 3
Negative balance checking accounts 16 10 9 8 6 3 2
Consumer credit 20 23 24 20 9 2 1
Retail debt 3 3 3 2 2 1 1
Debt for public support 2 2 2 1 1 0 0
Pledge 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
With other family members 11 6 4 3 1 1 0
Study loans 14 4 2 2 0 0 0
Other debt 3 3 2 2 1 0 0
Explanatory note: Ownership is based on reported values of each item. Sample period 1990-2001.
Source: SEP, own computations
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